How right President Trump’s skepticism and disappointment with Zelensky turned out to be
It must be acknowledged that we viewed the harsh criticisms of the President of the United States, Donald Trump, against Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, particularly those expressed on February 19, 2025, with a considerable degree of skepticism. Trump’s labeling of Zelensky as a “dictator,” together with the other serious political accusations he made at the time, were statements of an unusual nature for relations between two leaders of a political alliance of the West and had to be examined carefully, in light of the circumstances of the war and the intense American-Ukrainian political confrontation.
But President Zelensky’s statement today in Belgrade compels us to return, with a more critical perspective, to some of the questions that at the time we considered premature or unfair.
Because international politics, above all when it concerns the fate of states and nations, cannot be judged only by words, but by the coherence between the principles proclaimed and the concrete behavior of a state.
When a leader asks the democratic world for unconditional solidarity with the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and right of his nation to determine its own fate, while in another European capital reaffirming the non-recognition of a consolidated state reality such as Kosovo, the question inevitably arises as to whether principles are being subordinated to the diplomatic pragmatism of the moment.
We do not wish to believe that Kyiv’s policy is guided by narrow pragmatic or economic interests. But current Ukrainian diplomacy, at least in the case of Kosovo, creates precisely such a perception.
And this is the paradox.
A president who asks the world not to bargain over Ukraine’s sovereignty cannot treat the sovereignty and fate of Kosovo as an issue suitable for use within the architecture of relations with Belgrade.
This is not merely a matter of diplomatic courtesy. It is a matter of principle.
The statement by the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, today in Belgrade, that Ukraine is not changing its position regarding the non-recognition of Kosovo’s independence, cannot be regarded simply as a repetition of an old diplomatic formula. It takes on particular significance precisely because of the place where it was made: in Belgrade, alongside Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, at a time when Ukraine is seeking to strengthen its political and economic relations with Serbia.
Zelensky stated that Ukraine respects the territorial integrity of its partners and that, regarding Kosovo, Kyiv’s position remains unchanged. At the same time, he expressed gratitude to Serbia for its position regarding Ukraine’s territorial integrity, including Crimea.
But this is precisely where the question that cannot be ignored begins:
Can Ukraine’s territorial integrity be defended absolutely while denying a political and legal reality that has already passed through the principal institutions of the international system?
This is not a rhetorical question.
It is one of the fundamental questions of the coherence of the international legal order.
Kosovo and the Test of International Law
Kosovo declared independence on February 17, 2008. Since then, it has been recognized by a large number of states in the international community, including the United States and the majority of European Union countries.
But beyond the number of recognitions, there is a legal element that cannot be ignored.
On July 22, 2010, the International Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, issued its Advisory Opinion on Kosovo. The Court, by ten votes to four, concluded that Kosovo’s declaration of independence of February 17, 2008, had not violated international law. It also found that the declaration had not violated Security Council Resolution 1244 or the applicable Constitutional Framework in Kosovo.
This fact requires precise emphasis.
The Court did not “recognize Kosovo” as a state — that was not the question submitted to it — but it issued a legal finding of extraordinary importance: the act of declaring independence itself was not contrary to international law.
Therefore, when a state that asks the international community to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity refuses to recognize Kosovo, the contradiction cannot be hidden behind ordinary diplomatic formulas.
Because if international law is the foundation, it must be interpreted coherently.
If sovereignty is a principle, it cannot be a principle only when it serves us.
If territorial integrity is a universal value, it cannot become a selective instrument of foreign policy.
Solidarity Cannot Be a One-Way Street
The Albanians of Albania and Kosovo have understood the Ukrainian tragedy not only as a geopolitical crisis, but as a human drama and as a challenge to the European security order.
Albania has condemned Russian aggression, aligned itself with international sanctions, and supported Ukraine in Euro-Atlantic forums. Kosovo, too, has aligned itself with international measures against Russia and has continuously expressed political and humanitarian solidarity with Ukraine.
Kosovo, although it is not a member of the European Union and does not have a seat at the United Nations, has sought to act as part of the Euro-Atlantic political community that regards Russian aggression as a threat to the European order.
Therefore, the question is unavoidable:
When Kosovo and Albania have stood with Ukraine during its most difficult hours, why does Ukraine choose Belgrade to reaffirm precisely its non-recognition of Kosovo?
It is not being asked that Ukraine abandon its national interests.
No serious state can ask such a thing of another state.
But diplomacy cannot demand solidarity only when it needs it.
International relations have interests, but they also have memory.
They have alliances, but they also have morality.
They have strategic calculations, but they also have principles.
And when principle is repeatedly sacrificed in the name of calculation, the very meaning of international politics risks being reduced to a market where everything has a price.
Kosovo Is Not Crimea
Comparing Kosovo with the Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia is historically, politically, and legally inappropriate.
Kosovo is not Crimea.
Kosovo is not Donetsk.
Kosovo is not Ukrainian territory occupied by a foreign power and annexed through military force.
Kosovo’s history follows a different trajectory.
Kosovo and the Albanian territories of the Balkans have a long history of Albanian presence, continuity, and autochthony. At the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, the Albanian question became one of the major nodes of the crisis of the Ottoman Empire and of the territorial reconfiguration of the Balkans.
The decisions of the Great Powers at the London Conference of 1913 left a considerable part of the territories inhabited by Albanians outside the Albanian state. This created a new geopolitical reality, the consequences of which continue to be felt today.
For Albanians, Kosovo is not an abstract designation on a diplomatic map.
It is a central part of their national history, collective memory, and political and cultural identity.
The twentieth century transformed Kosovo into one of the most painful issues in Southeastern Europe. Repressive policies, interethnic conflicts, population displacement, and particularly the repression of the 1990s created a crisis that ultimately became a major European security issue.
NATO’s intervention in 1999, led politically and militarily by Western powers, particularly the United States, ended the campaign of violence and ethnic cleansing and opened the way for a new political order in Kosovo.
This was followed by the international process of administration and institution-building, leading to the declaration of independence in 2008.
Therefore, the case of Kosovo has a sui generis historical, political, and legal context. It cannot be mechanically placed in the same category as the territorial annexation of Crimea or the occupation of Ukrainian territories by Russia.
The ICJ itself, when examining the question of Kosovo, treated it as a specific issue, with its own legal and factual context.
This is why any attempt to use Kosovo as an automatic argument against Ukraine, or Ukraine as an automatic argument against Kosovo, is an unacceptable simplification of history and international law.
Is Belgrade the Reason for This Statement?
The timing and location of Zelensky’s statement have political significance.
His visit to Belgrade is the first official visit by a Ukrainian president to Serbia since he took office. During the visit, the two sides discussed strengthening economic relations, the European perspective, and other strategic issues. Serbia, meanwhile, continues to maintain close relations with Russia and has not joined Western sanctions against Moscow.
In this context, Zelensky’s statement on Kosovo can be interpreted as part of Kyiv’s pragmatic diplomacy toward Belgrade.
But this is precisely where the problem lies.
Kosovo cannot be the price of diplomatic rapprochement with Serbia.
If this were the logic of international relations, then every principle would be temporary and every cause would have a price.
And this would be particularly paradoxical for a state such as Ukraine, which has asked the world not to accept the notion that borders can be changed by force and that sovereignty can be relativized by the interests of larger powers.
How Right Was Trump’s Skepticism?
Here we return to Donald Trump’s statements.
In February 2025, Trump called Zelensky a “dictator” and accused him of a series of political failures related to the conduct of the war and relations with the United States. These statements were widely challenged at the time, and many of them were considered inaccurate or exaggerated.
We did not accept them then as self-evident.
Indeed, skepticism toward some of Trump’s criticisms was understandable, because Ukraine was and remains the victim of Russian aggression, and Zelensky has led his country under the conditions of an extraordinary war.
But today, in the face of the Belgrade statement, some of those criticisms take on another dimension.
Not necessarily because every accusation Trump made against Zelensky must be accepted.
But because political conduct must be judged by the correspondence between words and actions.
If Zelensky asks the world not to compromise Ukraine’s sovereignty, it is legitimate to ask why Ukraine is willing to make a political compromise regarding the reality of Kosovo.
If Ukraine asks international law to protect its borders, it is legitimate to ask why the opinion of the International Court of Justice concerning Kosovo’s declaration does not constitute an important element of its legal analysis.
And if Kyiv’s diplomacy seeks to expand international support for Ukraine, then it must understand that international respect is built not only on interest, but also on the credibility of principles.
We have no right to say, without evidence, that Zelensky is guided by business interests.
But we have the right to say that a diplomacy that appears to adapt its principles according to the needs of day-to-day relations creates a dangerous perception: that of a policy in which pragmatic interest may prevail over moral and legal coherence.
And this is precisely what should be a cause for concern.
Because a state may gain a temporary agreement by sacrificing a principle, but it may lose something far more important: its credibility.
A Question for President Zelensky
President Zelensky has repeatedly asked the democratic world not to relativize Ukraine’s right to sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Albanians understand this demand.
They understand it because Kosovo itself has experienced repression, conflict, the expulsion of its population, ethnic cleansing, international intervention, and the construction of a new political order.
Precisely for this reason, we would like Ukraine to see Kosovo not through the filter of Belgrade, but through its history and through the legal and political reality that has been created in Europe over recent decades.
Albanian-Ukrainian friendship should not be called into question by a presidential statement.
But true friendship also requires sincerity.
And sincerity requires saying openly:
Albania and Kosovo have stood with Ukraine. Ukraine should have at least an understanding for Kosovo.
No diplomatic favor is being requested.
What is being requested is consistency.
It is not being asked that Ukraine abandon its interests.
It is being asked that the principles of international law not be applied according to double standards.
Because in international politics there is a boundary that no immediate interest should cross: the boundary between diplomatic pragmatism and the relativization of principles.
And above all, it must not be forgotten:
Kosovo is a historical, political, legal, and institutional European reality. It may not be recognized by everyone. It may be politically contested by some states. But it cannot be erased from history, nor can it disappear from the political map of Europe through a sentence spoken in Belgrade. The history of Kosovo is not written in Belgrade. And its future cannot be negotiated there.